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Abstract
Misinformation under the form of rumor, hoaxes, and conspiracy theories spreads on social media
at alarming rates. One hypothesis is that, since social media are shaped by homophily, belief in
misinformation may be more likely to thrive on those social circles that are segregated from the rest
of the network. One possible antidote to misinformation is fact checking which, however, does not
always stop rumors from spreading further, owing to selective exposure and our limited attention.
What are the conditions under which factual verification are effective at containing the spreading of
misinformation? Here we take into account the combination of selective exposure due to network
segregation, forgetting (i.e., finite memory), and fact-checking. We consider a compartmental
model of two interacting epidemic processes over a network that is segregated between gullible and
skeptic users. Extensive simulation and mean-field analysis show that a more segregated network
facilitates the spread of a hoax only at low forgetting rates, but has no effect when agents forget at
faster rates. This finding may inform the development of mitigation techniques and raise awareness
on the risks of uncontrolled misinformation online.
∗ Corresponding author: marcella.tambuscio@gmail.com
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I. INTRODUCTION
Social media are rife with inaccurate information of all sorts [6, 18, 21]. This is in part
due to their egalitarian, bottom-up model of information consumption and production [9],
according to which users can broadcast to their peers information vetted by neither experts
nor journalists, and thus potentially inaccurate or misleading [28]. Examples of social media
misinformation include rumors [21], hoaxes [36], and conspiracy theories [3, 24].
In journalism, corrections, verification, and fact-checking are simple yet powerful anti-
dotes to misinformation [11], and several newsrooms employ these techniques to vet the
information they publish. Moreover, in recent years, several independent fact-checking or-
ganizations have emerged with the goal of debunking widely circulating claims online. From
now on, we refer to all these practices collectively as fact-checking. Among the leading
US-based fact-checking organizations we can cite Snopes [43], FactCheck.org [20], and Poli-
tifact [46]. Several more are joining their ranks worldwide [34]. In many cases these organi-
zations cannot cope with the sheer volume of misinformation circulating online, and some are
exploring alternatives to scale their verification efforts, including automated techniques [16],
and collaboration with technology platforms such as Facebook [38] and Google [19].
These trends thus beg a rather fundamental question — is the dissemination of fact-
checking information effective at stopping misinformation from spreading on social media?
In particular cases, timely corrections are enough to limit a rumor from spreading further [4,
21, 35]. However, administering fact-checking information may also have adverse effects. For
example, in some instances it has been observed that correcting an inaccurate or misleading
claim can have counterproductive effects, increasing — and not decreasing — belief in it.
This is a phenomenon called the backfire effect [36]. Recent work has however failed to
replicate this form of backfiring in independent trials, suggesting that it is a rather elusive
phenomenon [48].
Fact-checking could also lead to a hypercorrection effect, meaning that providing accurate
information to people who have been exposed to misinformation may cause them, on the
long term, to forget the former, and remember the latter [12]. Thus, given the growing
emphasis put into fact-checking, as well as its unintended side effects, it is clear that, for
a better understanding of how to fight social media misinformation, it would be useful to
explore the relation between fact-checking and the misinformation it is intended to quell.
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Recent work has also revealed that, when it comes to misinformation, online conver-
sations tend to be highly polarized [10, 18]. This suggests the importance of homophily
and segregation in the spread of misinformation. Since social networks are shaped by ho-
mophily [29], one hypothesis is that misinformation may be more likely to thrive in those
social circles that are segregated from the rest of the network. Social media may be partic-
ularly susceptible to this aspect due to the fact that exposure to information is mediated in
part by algorithms, whose goal is to filter and recommend stories that have a high potential
for engagement. This may create filter bubbles and echo chambers, information spaces that
favor confirmation bias and repetition [39, 44]. Recent work has started to measure the
extent to which editorial decisions performed automatically by algorithms affect selective
exposure, and thus segregation of the information space [7, 33]. Therefore, in modeling the
interplay between misinformation and fact-checking, our second goal is to shed light on the
role of the underlying social network structure in the spreading process, in particular the
presence of communities of users with different attitude toward unvetted and unconfirmed
information — which could potentially constitute misinformation.
Besides segregation, in the literature there is also disagreement about whether weak ties
— the links that connect different communities together — play a role in the diffusion of
information. Some studies suggest that weak ties play an important role [8]; others that they
do not [37]. In their seminal work on complex social contagion, Centola and Macy argue
that the spread of collective actions benefits from bridges, i.e. ties that are “wide enough
to transmit strong social reinforcement” [13]. It is well known that misinformation can be
propagated thanks to repetition [2, 27], which in some ways can be obtained through social
reinforcement, and thus it would be useful to investigate this additional aspect as well.
In terms of modeling, there has hitherto been little work on characterizing the epidemic
spreading of different types of information, with most efforts devoted to describing mu-
tually independent processes [23, 32]. Instead, the presence of the rich cognitive effects
just described suggests that misinformation and fact-checking interact and compete for the
attention of individuals on social media, and this could lead to non-trivial diffusion dynam-
ics. Among the work specifically devoted to competition in the diffusion of information, or
memes, the literature has focused on the role of limited attention [25, 47], as well as that of
information quality [31, 41].
Several models have been proposed in prior work to describe the propagation of rumors
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FIG. 1. The transitions states for the generic i-th agent of our hoax epidemic model. To simplify
the model, here we set pv = 1− α.
in a complex social networks [1, 14, 17, 30]. Most are based on the epidemic compartmental
models like the SIR (Susceptible–Infected–Recovered) [40], contemplating the fact-checking
only as a remedy after the hoax infection. Another class of models uses branching processes
on signed networks to take into account user polarization [18]. Neither type, however,
takes into account in the same model the three aforementioned mechanisms — competition
between hoax and fact-checking, forgetting mechanisms and segregation.
To consider all these features, here we introduce a simple agent-based model in which
individuals are endowed with finite memory and a fixed predisposition toward factual veri-
fication. In this model, hoax and fact checks compete on a network formed by two groups,
the gullible and the skeptic, marked by a different tendency to believe in the hoax. Varying
the level of segregation in the network, as well as the relative credibility of the hoax among
the two groups, we look at whether the hoax becomes endemic or instead is eradicated from
the whole population.
II. MODEL
Here we describe a model of the spread of the belief in a hoax and the related fact checking
within a social network of agents with finite memory. An agent can be in any of the following
three states: ‘Susceptible’ (denoted by S), if they have not heard about neither the hoax
nor the fact checking, or if they have forgotten about it; ‘Believer’ (B), if they believe in the
hoax and choose to spread it; and ‘Fact checker’ (F ) if they know the hoax is false — for
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example after having consulted an accurate news source — and choose to spread the fact
checking.
Let us consider the i-th agent at time step t and let us denote with nXi (t) the number of
its neighbors in state X ∈ {S,B, F}. We assume that an agent ‘decides’ to believe in either
the hoax or the fact checking as a result of interaction over interpersonal ties. This could be
due to social conformity [5] or because agents accept information from their neighbors [42].
Second, we assume that the hoax displays an intrinsic credibility α ∈ [0, 1], which, all else
being equal, makes it more believable than the fact checking. We will discuss later how this
parameter can be also related to the users: by now, we consider it as a feature of the hoax.
Thus, the probability of transitioning from S to either B or F are given by functions fi, and
gi, respectively:
fi(t) = β
nBi (1 + α)
nBi (1 + α) + n
F
i (1− α)
(1)
gi(t) = β
nFi (1− α)
nBi (1 + α) + n
F
i (1− α)
(2)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the overall spreading rate. Furthermore, agents possess finite memory,
which means that at each time step, any believer of fact checker can ‘forget’ about the
hoax with fixed probability pf or the fact check and become susceptible again. Finally, any
believer who has not forgotten the hoax yet can decide to check the news and stop believing
in the hoax, becoming a fact checker. This happens with probability pv. In any other case,
an agent remains in its current state. The full model with the transition states are shown
in Fig. 1.
Observe that, since fi(t) + gi(t) = β, which is equivalent to the infection rate of the
SIS model. Indeed, if one considers the two states B and F as single ‘Infected’ state (I),
then our model is reduced to an SIS model, with the only difference that the probability of
recovery µ is denoted by pf .
Let us denote by si(t) the state of the i-th agent at time t, and let us define, for
X ∈ {B,F, S}, the state indicator function sXi (t) = δ(si(t), X). The triple pi(t) =[
pBi (t), p
F
i (t), p
S
i (t)
]
describes the probability that a node i is in any of the three states
at time t. The dynamics of the system at time t + 1 will be then given by a random
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realization of pi at t+ 1. Thus, pi(t+ 1) can be described as:
pBi (t+ 1) = fi(t)s
S
i (t) + (1− pf )(1− pv)sBi (t) (3)
pFi (t+ 1) = gi(t)s
S
i (t) + pv(1− pf )sBi (t) + (1− pf )sFi (t) (4)
pSi (t+ 1) = pf
[
sBi (t) + s
F
i (t)
]
+ [1− fi(t)− gi(t)] sSi (t) (5)
In previous work [45] we analyzed the behavior of the model at equilibrium. Starting
from a well-mixed topology of N agents, in which a few agents have been initially seeded as
believers, we derived the expressions for the density of believers, fact checkers, and suscep-
tible agents in the infinite-time limit denoted by B∞, F∞, and S∞, respectively. We found
that, independent of the network topology (Baraba´si-Albert and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi), the value of
pv, and of α, S∞ stabilizes around the same values in all simulations. We confirmed such a
result using both mean-field equations and simulations.
Once the system reaches equilibrium, the relative ratio between believers and fact checkers
is determined by α and pv: such as the higher α, the more believers, and conversely for pv.
In particular, we showed that there always exists a critical value of pv above which the hoax
is completely eradicated from the network (i.e., B∞ = 0). This value depends on α and pf ,
but not on the spreading rate β.
As one can see, the model has several parameters, namely, spreading rate β, credibility
of the hoax α, probability of verification pv and probability of forgetting pf . Since, in the
present work, we want to consider the role of communities of people with different attitudes
to believe to an hoax, the number of parameters is going to increase.
As an attempt to reduce the number of parameters, we set
pv = 1− α. (6)
This simplification can be motivated by assuming that the more credible a piece of news
is, the lower are the chances anybody will try to check its veracity. This means that we
restrict the parameters space pv×α to a line. This constrain can be easily observed in Fig. 3
(left), where the curve represents the analytic threshold on the verifying probability. Above
it the hoax becomes endemic, over it the hoax is completely removed. We note that even
with this additional constrain, this new, simplified model exhibits the same behaviors that
our original model can produce (i.e., believers survive or not).
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FIG. 2. Epidemic threshold for the simplified version of the model given by Eq. 6. The grey
area indicates the region of the parameter space where the hoax is completely removed from the
network. The white part indicates the region of the parameter space where the hoax can become
endemic.
Recomputing the mean-field equations with Eq. 6, we obtain now a critical value for pf ,
a sufficient condition that guarantees the removal of the hoax from the network:
pf ≤ (1− α)
2
1 + α2
=⇒ pB(∞) = 0. (7)
The behaviour of pf versus α is shown in Fig. 2. For any combination of pf and α below
the curve, the hoax is completely removed from the network. For combinations above the
curve, the infection is instead endemic. The forgetting probability can be considered as a
measure of the attention toward a specific topic, meaning that if there is a large discussion
around the subject, then exposed people tend to have a stable opinion about it, otherwise the
probability to forget the belief and the news will be higher. The presence of this threshold
in Eq. 7 could suggest that the level of attention plays an important role in fake news global
spread and persistence.
III. RESULTS
Two parameters govern the spreading dynamics in our model. These are the credibility
α and forgetting probability pf . To address our research question about the role of network
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FIG. 3. Simplification of the model setting pv = 1 − α, here fixing pf = 0.1. On the left we can
observe the phase diagram of the entire parameter space considered for the model. In this new
work we are restricting it to the dashed line, but we are keeping all the possible configurations of
the model: believers can survive (dark line) or not (pale line), as we can see comparing the dots
on the left to the curves on the right that show evolution of believers numbers in the network over
time.
structure and communities, we consider a simple generative model of a segregated network.
Let us consider N agents divided into two groups, one comprised by t < N agents whose
beliefs conform more to the hoax than the other one, which is comprised by the rest of the
population. We call the former the gullible group, while the latter the skeptic group. To
represent this in our framework, we set different values of α for each agent group (either
αgu or αsk, αgu > αsk). This is not a contradiction with what we said before: the credibility
is a parameter describing the hoax, but of course is also related to the user attitude and
personal worldviews, then it is reasonable to think to different values for different groups.
To generate the network, we assign M edges at random. Let s ∈ [1
2
, 1
)
denote the fraction
of intra-group edges, regardless of the group. For each edge we first decide, with probability
s, whether two individuals from the same group (intra-group tie) or different groups (inter-
group tie) should be connected. In the case of an intra-group tie, we select a group with
probability proportional to the relative ratio of the total number of possible inter-group ties
8
FIG. 4. Network structure under different segregation regimes between two groups (in this case of
equal size). In the figure, three different values of s were used. (a): s = 0.6, (b): s = 0.8, and (c):
s = 0.95. Node layout was computed using a force-directed algorithm [22].
(of that group) to that of the whole network; then, we pick uniformly at random two agents
from that group and connect them. In the second case, two agents are chosen at random,
one per group, and connected. Fig. 4 shows three examples of network with different values
of s.
To understand the behavior of the model in this segregated network, we performed ex-
tensive numerical simulations. We set fixed values for αsk and we considered a wide range of
values of αgu, pf , s, and t. Fig. 5 reports the results of the first of these exercises, showing
the overall number of believers B∞ in the whole population at equilibrium.
Increasing either γ or αgu we see an increase of B∞, all else being equal. However, when
we changed the segregation s we observed two different situations: for small pf , an increase
9
FIG. 5. Believers at equilibrium in the phase space of s × αgu. We considered two forgetting
regimes: (a): low forgetting, pf = 0.1, and (b): high forgetting, pf = 0.8. Other parameters:
αsk = 0.4. Each point was averaged over 50 simulations.
of s resulted in an increase of B∞. Conversely — and perhaps a bit surprisingly — under
high values of pf increasing s does not change B∞.
Trying to better understand the role of pf , we further explore the behavior of the model
by varying the size of the gullible group γ and its level of segregation s. In Fig. 6 we
report the relevant phase diagrams, breaking down the number of believers at equilibrium
by group, i.e., B∞ = Bgu∞ + B
sk
∞. If pf is low (Fig 6, left column), the overall number of
believers depends heavily on Bgu∞ , whereas B
sk
∞ ≈ 0, and the segregation is unimportant,see
Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(c).
Instead, with an high rate of forgetting (right column), B∞ (Fig. 6(f)) depends on both
Bsk∞ and B
gu
∞ . But in this case we have a different role of the segregation: while in the
skeptic group Bsk∞ decreases when s increases, see Fig. 6(d), in the gullible group s has fewer
influence, see Fig. 6(b).
To give an analytical support to our findings, we obtain mean-field approximation for the
model (details in the Appendix) and we perform both numerical integration of the mean
field equations and agent-based simulations, which give very similar results. Fig. 7 shows
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FIG. 6. Believers at equilibrium under low (pf = 0.1) and high forgetting (pf = 0.8) rate. The
number of believers at equilibrium is broken down as B∞ = B
gu∞+Bsk∞. Phase diagrams in the space
s × γ for (a) Bgu∞ , low forgetting, (b) Bgu∞ , high forgetting, (c) Bsk∞ low forgetting, (d) Bsk∞ high
forgetting, (e) B∞ low forgetting, and (f) B∞ high forgetting. We fixed αgu = 0.9 and αsk = 0.05.
the phase diagrams obtained by numerical simulations of the mean-field equations.
Summarizing, segregation can have a very different role on the final configuration of the
hoax spreading and this depends on the forgetting rate. Why the number of links among
communities with different behaviors is so important? It should be noted that any ‘network
effect’ present in our model will only appear in the infection phase, that is for transitions
S → B and S → F . To better understand what happens in both groups, we computed
the rate at which these transitions happen, that is, the conditional probability of, being
susceptible, becoming either believer or fact checker.
Let us consider a susceptible agent in the gullible group. At low forgetting rates, in the
gullible group more intra-group ties (i.e. an higher s) increase the chances of becoming a
11
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FIG. 7. Mean-field approximation for different values of pv: these phase diagrams represent the
density of Believers at equilibrium varying γ and s, exactly as in Figure 6.
believer and reduce those of becoming fact checker; see Fig. 8 (top left). In the skeptic group,
the segregation effect is almost negligible (top right). This happens because inter-group ties
expose the susceptible agents, among the gullible, to more members of the skeptic group,
who are largely fact checkers.
At high forgetting rates, instead, we observe the opposite behavior: more inter-group ties
translate into more exposure, for susceptible users in the skeptic group, to gullible agents
who are, by and large, believers. In the gullible group (bottom left of Fig. 8), segregation
is not very important while, in the skeptic group, more connections with the gullible mean
more believers (bottom right of Fig. 8).
In other words, the role of segregation, being related to the abundance of inter-group ties,
can have both a positive and negative role in stopping the spread of misinformation: for
low forgetting rates, these links can help the spread of the debunking in the gullible group,
while for high forgetting rates, they have the opposite effect, helping the hoax spread in the
skeptic group.
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FIG. 8. Rate of transitions of type S → B and S → F at equilibrium. We run the simulation until
the system has reached the steady state and then compute the average number of transitions per
susceptible. The plot shows averages over 50 simulations.
IV. DISCUSSION
Using agent-based simulations, here we have analyzed the role of the underlying structure
of the network on which the diffusion of a piece of misinformation takes place. In particular
we consider a network formed by two groups — gullible and skeptic — characterized by
different values of the credibility parameter α. In order to study how the social structure
shapes information exposure, we introduce a parameter s that regulates the abundance of
ties between these two groups. We observe that s has an important role in the diffusion of
misinformation. If the probability of forgetting pf is small then the fraction of the population
affected by the hoax will be large or small depending on whether the network is respectively
segregated or not. However, if the rate of forgetting is large, segregation has no effect on
the spread of the hoax.
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The probability of forgetting could be also interpreted as a measure of how much a given
topic is discussed. A low value of pf could perhaps fit well with the scenario of a ideas whose
belief tends to be more persistent over time, for example conspiracy theories. A high value
pf could fit better with situations where beliefs are short lived, either because the claims
are easy to debunk or are no more interesting than mere gossip, whose information value is
transient. Hoaxes about the alleged death of celebrities, for instance, could fall within this
latter category.
On the basis of the findings presented in this paper, further research should be devoted to
understanding the role of segregation in the spread of misinformation on social media. For
conspiracy theories, it could be useful to analyze what happens if the communication among
different groups increases. Moreover, it could be also interesting to consider more realistic
situations in which credibility is distributed over the population according to socio-economic
features and other individual-level attributes.
Our results are also important from a purely theoretical point of view. Indeed, the model
we had introduced in prior work, and on which we have build upon here, was an example of
an epidemic process that is not affected by the network topology, meaning that the structure
does not influence the final configuration of the network — indeed, it could be proved that
there are no significant differences in the behavior of the spreading dynamics in random
or scale-free networks [45]. In the present work, however, we show that actually network
structure can become very important if we add a layer of complexity, characterizing groups
of nodes with slightly different behaviors (here different values of the credibility parameter).
This can suggest a lot of research, experiments and simulations in order to understand which
parameters are sensitive to the segregation level, or some other topology measure, even in
models that have usually topology-independent dynamics.
In conclusion, understanding the production and consumption of misinformation is a crit-
ical issue [15]. As several episodes are showing, there are obvious consequences connected to
the uncontrolled production and consumption of inaccurate information [26]. A more thor-
ough understanding of rumor propagation and the structural properties of the information
exchange networks on which this happens may help mitigate these risks.
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Appendix A: Appendix
1. Mean-Field computations
In previous work we showed mean-field analysis for our model on a homogeneous net-
work [45]. Similarly, here we perform a similar analysis for our model on a network segre-
gated in two groups, skeptic and gullible: for each group we have three equations (see Eq. 5)
representing the spreading process.
pBig(t+ 1) = fig(t)s
S
ig(t) + (1− pf )(1− pv)sBig(t)
pFig(t+ 1) = gig(t)s
S
ig(t) + pv(1− pf )sBig(t) + (1− pf )sFig(t)
pSig(t+ 1) = pf
[
sBig(t) + s
F
ig(t)
]
+
[
1− fig(t)− gig(t)
]
sSig(t)
pBisk(t+ 1) = fisk(t)s
S
isk
(t) + (1− pf )(1− pv)sBisk(t)
pFisk(t+ 1) = gisk(t)s
S
isk
(t) + pv(1− pf )sBisk(t) + (1− pf )sFisk(t)
pSisk(t+ 1) = pf
[
sBisk(t) + s
F
isk
(t)
]
+ [1− fisk(t)− gisk(t)] sSisk(t)
In these equations we can substitute si(t) with pi(t) and when t → ∞ we can assume
pi(t) = pi(t+1) = pi(∞) for all i ∈ N . Hereafter we simplify the notation using pBg (∞) = pBg
(and analogously for the other cases). Now, let us consider the spreading functions for the
gullible agents. Similar equations can be written for the case of skeptic agents. The spreading
functions are:
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fig(t) = β
nBig(1 + α)
nBig(1 + α) + nig i
F (1− α)
gig(t) = β
nFig(1− α)
nBig(1 + α) + n
F
ig
(1− α)
Assuming that all vertices have the same number of neighbors 〈k〉, and that these neigh-
bors are chosen randomly, we can write nBi = s ·nBig+(1−s) ·nBisk , where nBig = γ ·〈k〉pBg and
nBisk = (1−γ)·〈k〉pBsk. Similarly, for nFi , we can obtain an expression that is not dependent on
i. This simplifies the equations and lets us to simulate the process iterating the application
of them until the values of pSsk, p
B
sk, p
F
sk, p
S
g , p
B
g , p
F
g have reached stability.
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